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Structural Cooperative Federalism
Kate Glover*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the status of cooperative federalism as a legal
principle in Canadian constitutionalism. It argues that our understanding
of cooperative federalism – often called the “modern form” of federalism
in Canada1 – is enriched by looking to constitutional contexts beyond the
division of powers. This article focuses on just one of those contexts, that
is, it explores the lessons to be learned about cooperative federalism from
the text and structure of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.2
This article argues that Part V, which sets out the procedure for formally
amending the Constitution of Canada, is an expression of cooperative
federalism, indeed, a strong one. The amending procedure calls for
coordinated action between federal and provincial legislative actors when
amending the Constitution in relation to many of the country’s most
constitutionally meaningful issues. Cooperative federalism both describes
part of the vision of government that informs Part V and helps to explain the
animating principles and procedural demands of Part V. An in-depth look at
Part V supports the claim that cooperative federalism is not simply a matter
of modern political practice or judicial interpretation, as the cases suggest,
but rather is embedded in the architecture of Canada’s Constitution. After
exploring this claim, this article then considers its implications for the
*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. An early version of
this article was presented at the 19th Annual Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference. Thank
you to the Conference participants for their helpful comments and to Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin
Berger for their support and insight in the writing of this article. Thank you also to Howie Kislowicz,
Mike Pal, and the anonymous reviewer of the SCLR for their careful, insightful comments. All
errors and shortcomings are my own.
1
See e.g., Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14,
2015 SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, at para. 147 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Quebec (AG)”]; Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), [2015]
S.C.J. No. 46, 2015 SCC 46, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250, at para. 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goodwin”];
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 42
(S.C.C.), affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
2
Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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interpretation of sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.3 Noting
that the meaning of the cooperative principle will continue to unfold in
future cases, this article considers whether some duties of regard or good
faith should attach when governments engage in co-operative legislative
partnerships.
Bringing the amending formula into the mainstream conversation on
cooperative federalism is not the usual practice. Despite overlap in the aims
of sections 91 and 92 and the amending procedures, these two parts of the
Constitution are not often discussed in relation to each other. When they are,
their relationship is usually described as one of alternatives or competitors –
both are ways of achieving public policy goals, yet the former is the easier
route given political realities.4 Rarely are the constitutional amending
procedures read through the lens of cooperative federalism and rarely is
Part V looked to as a source of insight into cooperative federalism or the
interpretation of sections 91 and 92. This article begins to bridge this divide
in an effort to deepen our understanding of cooperative federalism in
Canadian constitutionalism.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I canvasses recent
jurisprudential claims about the status and role of cooperative federalism
in Canadian constitutional law and politics. The cases establish that
cooperative federalism is identified as a guiding principle of constitutional
interpretation in division of powers cases and is understood to be an
instantiation of the more general principle of federalism in modern
Canada. Part II, the heart of the article, argues that despite the Supreme
Court’s contention that sections 91 and 92 are the “primary textual
expression of the principle of federalism in our Constitution”,5 cooperative
federalism is relevant to constitutional practice and interpretation in
contexts other than the traditional division of powers. In particular, the
principle of cooperative federalism finds strong structural expression
in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. Part III of this article considers the
implications of a structural account of cooperative federalism for the
division of powers context. It notes that these implications remain to be
worked out in practice and in the jurisprudence, but wonders whether,

3
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), ss. 91, 92, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App II, No. 5.
4
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. Suppl), at 5-46, cited in Quebec (AG),
supra, note 1, at para. 17.
5
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 47
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession Reference”].
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at a minimum, the principle of cooperative federalism entails a level of
regard by one legislative actor for the interests of its legislative partners
when engaged in joint action. In this discussion, I draw on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Quebec v. Canada (“Quebec (AG)”) as a case
study.6 In particular, I explore the merits of the dissenting opinion and
suggest that the principle of cooperative federalism may give rise to legal
duties beyond those discussed in the judgment.
This article is not about the value of cooperation as the organizing
principle of a federation. There are many ways to configure a federal
relationship, with cooperation as only one possible orienting maxim.
Such a maxim has virtues as a guide for political and interpretive
practices. But those virtues will always depend on the context in which
the cooperative principle is invoked7 and will always have limits.8
Instead, the normative prescription of this article is found in what it
counsels for understanding the constitutional architecture. The argument
is that when we account for Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, we see
that the roots of cooperation are more firmly grounded in the Constitution
than the current jurisprudence suggests.

II. THE STATUS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN DIVISION OF
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
In Canadian constitutional law, cooperative federalism is understood as
both a descriptive concept and a legal principle.9 As a concept, it describes a
political phenomenon, one in which agents of the central and regional
governments develop mechanisms for redistributing powers and resources.10
As a legal principle, it serves as a guide for constitutional interpretation in
division of powers cases. Cooperative federalism is to be “given due
weight”, meaning that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867
should be read to allow for “interplay, indeed overlap” between spheres of
federal and provincial authority and to favour “the application of valid rules

6

Quebec (AG), supra, note 1.
Jeremy Webber, The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2015), at 169-171.
8
See e.g., Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, “Constitutional Amendment Rules: The
Denominator Problem” in Tom Ginsburg, ed., Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 195.
9
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 17.
10
Id., citing Hogg, supra, note 4, at 5-46.
7
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adopted by governments at both levels” over enforcing strict jurisdictional
silos.11 “Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms”, Justices
Binnie and LeBel wrote in Canadian Western Bank. Rather, the
“Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life and
for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have rightly
observed the importance of co-operation among government actors to ensure
that federalism operates flexibly”.12
Recent case law shows that cooperative federalism is invoked as “the
guiding principle” when applying the division of powers doctrines. For
example, the jurisprudence provides that the doctrine of incidental effects
should allow for interjurisdictional overlap, as long as each order of
government is properly pursuing objectives within its jurisdiction.13
Similarly, the doctrine of paramountcy is to be narrowly construed and
applied. In the absence of clear evidence, the courts are to avoid broad
articulations of Parliamentary purpose that would bring federal legislation
into conflict with provincial statutes.14 As the courts have explained,
unsupported expansive readings of the purpose of federal legislation
undermine opportunities for cooperative schemes.15 In addition, the courts
have tightened the yoke of interjurisdictional immunity in light of
cooperative federalism. Resorting to interjurisdictional immunity or
applying it rigorously is inconsistent with the “dominant tide”, that is the
cooperative tide, of Canadian federalism.16
Despite the status of cooperative federalism as a “guiding principle” in
division of powers cases, the jurisprudence confirms that the principle has
limits. These limits arise when “legislative overlap jeopardizes the balance
between unity and diversity”.17 If, for example, it is impossible to comply
with overlapping federal and provincial statutes or if a provincial statute
frustrates a Parliamentary purpose, the risk of imbalance becomes real and

11
Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd., [2015] S.C.J. No. 53,
2015 SCC 53, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lemare Lake Logging”];
Goodwin, supra, note 1, at para. 33.
12
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
13
Goodwin, supra, note 1, at paras. 32-33; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 28.
14
Lemare Lake Logging, supra, note 11, at paras. 21, 23.
15
Id., at para. 23.
16
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 17; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 37.
17
Alberta (AG) v. Moloney, [2015] S.C.J. No. 51, 2015 SCC 51, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 327, at para. 16
(S.C.C.), affg [2014] A.J. No. 155 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Moloney”]. Put another way, the limits of
cooperative federalism arise when its invocation would “override or modify” the balance captured by ss. 91
and 92: Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, at para. 61
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Securities Reference”]; Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 19.
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the cooperative principle cedes to the doctrine of paramountcy.18 In addition,
cooperative federalism cannot be used to limit the scope of federal or
provincial legislative authority or to ground a positive obligation to
cooperate when the Constitution authorizes unilateral action.19
The scope of the principle of cooperative federalism was at issue in
Quebec (AG) and ultimately divided the Court. The main question in the
case was whether Parliament could unilaterally dismantle the long gun
registry and destroy the data held within it. The majority held that
Parliament had this authority. The registry had been validly established
under Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law and could therefore be
validly dismantled in the same way. According to the majority, Parliament
was under no constitutional obligation to consult Quebec when repealing the
registry enactments, to consider the effects on Quebec, or to offer the
registry data to officials in Quebec.20 Cooperative federalism did not entail
otherwise.
The majority in Quebec (AG) conceded that its analysis might have
been different had the registry been a “truly interlocking federal-provincial
legislative framework”.21 In contrast, the dissenting judges believed that
the legislative scheme establishing the registry had already met the
requisite standard of partnership. On this point, Justices LeBel, Wagner,
and Gascon, writing jointly in dissent (Abella J. concurring), were of the
view that the nature of the registry scheme was such that the “interlocking”
standard had been met. In their view, the federal and provincial actors had
entered into a true partnership with respect to firearms control and in
pursuit of both federal (criminal law) and provincial (public safety and
administration of justice) purposes.22 In looking to the constitutional
consequences of this intergovernmental partnership, the dissenting judges
reasoned that the division of powers doctrines had to protect joint schemes
at both the time of implementation and in the process of dismantling.23 It
would “hardly make sense”, they wrote, “to encourage co-operation and
find that schemes established in the context of a partnership are valid while
at the same time refusing to take this particular context into account when
those schemes are terminated”.24
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See e.g., Moloney, id.
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 20.
Id.
Id., at para. 4.
Id., at paras. 115-135.
Id., at para. 152.
Id., at para. 152.
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What, then, must be accounted for in assessing the constitutional
obligations attendant upon dismantling a joint legislative scheme? Justices
LeBel, Wagner, and Gascon ultimately held that the impugned provision of
the federal legislation dismantling the registry was unconstitutional
because it was, in pith and substance, outside the federal criminal law
power and was not justified under the ancillary powers doctrine. However,
the reasoning of the dissenting judges was informed by the principle of
cooperative federalism. According to the dissenting opinion, the logic of
cooperative federalism gives rise to positive obligations on both legislative
and judicial actors when assessing the constitutionality of legislation. They
explain that in order to adopt legislation that terminates an
intergovernmental partnership in a way that is consistent with the principle
of cooperative federalism, Parliament or a provincial legislative assembly
must consider the “reasonably foreseeable consequences” of the decision
to terminate on the other order of government.25 Similarly, when exercising
their powers of judicial review, the courts must be mindful of the impact of
the legislation on the partner’s exercise of powers.26 Justices LeBel,
Wagner, and Gascon were of the view that these obligations flow from the
principles of cooperative federalism and the separation of powers:
…a co-operative scheme from which both the federal and provincial
governments benefit cannot be dismantled unilaterally by one of the
parties without taking the impact of such a decision on its partner’s
heads of power into account…. In a co-operative context, actions of a
government at one level can have serious consequences for the other
level. It is therefore necessary to show vigilance for the increased risk
of disrupting the constitutional balance that is protected by the principle
of federalism. The concern here is not to alter the separation of powers
in our Constitution through the application of co-operative federalism,
but to ensure that it is respected.27

Ultimately, cooperative federalism is concerned with ensuring that
agents of the federation can respond to social and political realities, which
do not necessarily fit neatly in the categories imagined by sections 91 and
92, in the exercise of their respective constitutional authority. As a legal
principle, cooperative federalism favours interpretations of the division of
powers that respect and facilitate cooperative intergovernmental efforts.
In this way, the principle of cooperative federalism counsels expansive
25
26
27

Id., at para. 153.
Id., at para. 153.
Id., at para. 154.

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

STRUCTURAL COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

51

(or, from a different perspective, intrusive) interpretations of jurisdictional
authority. It “permits a government at one level to pass laws that have an
impact on the powers of the other level”.28 That said, in the ordinary
division of powers context, the principle of cooperative federalism has no
positive obligation of cooperation attached; it is permissive. Government
officials are under no duty to cooperate or to interpret their authority
expansively when pursuing legislative goals, but the opportunity to do so
is available.
Quebec (AG) draws our attention to cases in which federal and
provincial actors are involved jointly in a legislative scheme and disagree
about whether and to what degree the scheme should survive. But the case
law establishes that the principle of cooperative federalism is also invoked
as the guiding interpretive principle in cases in which the legislative
scheme under review has no coordinated or joint qualities.29 In such cases,
even though the impugned scheme is an exercise of unilateral efforts by
one order of government, the principle of cooperative federalism is still
called on to guide the constitutional analysis.30 The cases show that the
principle is consistently in play and is directed at authorizing the overlap
and interplay of broadly interpreted legislative powers. That said, there
remains some uncertainty about the scope, status and role of cooperative
federalism as an interpretive principle in the division of powers context.
Recent cases that consider the status of cooperative federalism describe
cooperative federalism as the “modern” or “contemporary” version of
federalism in Canada.31 On this view, federalism – an assumption
“inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements”32 – sits at
Canada’s constitutional core, aiming to reconcile diversity with unity,
police the constitutional division of powers, and maintain a balance
between federal and provincial powers.33 It is a principle that takes on
different meanings over time. As Justices LeBel, Wagner and Gascon
explain in Quebec (AG), the meaning of federalism has changed over the
course of Canada’s constitutional history:
[146] According to the “classical” approach favoured by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council until 1949, the heads of power
28

Id., at para. 154.
See e.g., Goodwin, supra, note 1; Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 1.
30
See e.g., Lemare Lake Logging, supra, note 11 and Moloney, supra, note 17.
31
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 147; Goodwin, supra, note 1, at para. 33; Canadian
Western Bank, supra, note 1, at para. 42.
32
Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 56.
33
Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 43; Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 145.
29
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constituted “watertight compartments”, and overlaps between them
were to be avoided to the extent possible: Reference re Securities Act,
at para. 56.
[147] The modern view of federalism rejects this approach and replaces
it with a more flexible conception of the division of powers that is
dominant in this Court’s recent jurisprudence. This conception
“recognizes that in practice there is significant overlap between the
federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction, and provides that both
governments should be permitted to legislate for their own valid
purposes in these areas of overlap”…. Such a conception thus
facilitates intergovernmental co-operation…. Both in law and in the
political arena, the concept of “co-operative federalism” has been
developed to adapt the principle of federalism to this modern reality. 34

On this understanding, federalism is part of the scaffolding around
which the Constitution is constructed; it cannot be extracted from the
constitutional order without renovating the constitutional architecture on
a grand scale.35 Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, has
constitutional status because it is the prevailing version of federalism
simpliciter. It is, in other words, fruit of Canada’s constitutional living
tree. It follows that the character of Canadian federalism can continue to
evolve by virtue of political practice, prevailing attitudes, legislative
experience, and so on, into an alternative version – cooperative or
otherwise.
The principle of cooperative federalism is an expression of a political
practice, one shaped by a long constitutional history of approaches to
interpretation, justification, and limits. There is value in preserving its
flexibility. The status of the principle of federalism – the “lodestar by
which the courts have been guided”36 – remains stable; its entrenched
status is unaffected by changes in its meaning over time. Yet, the case
law also establishes that the parts of the Constitution of Canada are
linked and that constitutional meaning must come from the whole.37 This
34
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at paras. 146-7, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS
Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para. 62
(S.C.C.), affg [2010] B.C.J. No. 57 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “PHS”]; Canadian Western Bank, supra,
note 1, at paras. 36-37; Securities Reference, supra, note 17, at paras. 56, 57-8; and OPSEU v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 19-20 (S.C.C.), affg [1980]
O.J. No. 3863 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “OPSEU”].
35
On federalism as a fundamental unwritten principle of the Constitution, see e.g., Secession
Reference, supra, note 5, at paras. 33-48 and 55-60.
36
Secession Reference, supra, note 5, at para. 56.
37
Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704
at paras. 26-27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reform Reference”].
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view reflects a structural approach to constitutional interpretation.
On such a model, an inquiry into the meaning of Canadian federalism
should look beyond the traditional division of powers realm to other
parts of the Constitution to gather interpretive insights from the
constitutional order as a whole. This article takes up just one small part
of this project – exploring the insights to be learned about cooperative
federalism by looking beyond sections 91 and 92 to the Canadian
constitutional amending procedure, to which I now turn.

III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND PART V
This section makes the claim that Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982
is an expression of cooperative federalism, both as a descriptive concept
(that is, in what it asks of Canada’s political actors who seek to amend
the Constitution) and as an interpretive principle (that is, in what it
requires of our understanding of the many amending procedures set out
in Part V).38 Not only is joint action required by the amending procedure,
but the cooperative demands are broad and act as limits on related grants
of unilateral jurisdiction. The subsections below trace the ways in which
the amendment context lines up with the descriptive and interpretive
dimensions of cooperative federalism. The aim is to establish that Part V
properly belongs in the conversation about cooperative federalism and
that its claim to this position is strong.
1. Cooperative Federalism as a Descriptive Concept
Cooperative federalism describes an aspect of the political practices
and relationships contemplated by Part V. The demands for coordinated
action that Part V makes are apparent on the face of the constitutional text.
Part V sets out a number of amending procedures – multilateral, bilateral,
and unilateral. The general rule, set out in section 38(1), provides that
constitutional amendments require the consent (in the form of resolutions)
of the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative assemblies of
two-thirds of the provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of
the provinces.39 This general procedure applies to all amendments that do
On federalism as the “unifying principle” of Part V, see Carissima Mathen, “The Federal
Principle: Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed.,
Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), at 65.
39
Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 2, s. 38(1).
38
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not fall within one of the other (exceptional) procedures, including
amendments in relation to proportionate representation, the method of
selecting senators, and the Supreme Court of Canada.40
The most onerous exception to the general procedure is set out in
section 41. It requires unanimous consent of the Senate, House of
Commons and the legislative assemblies of the provinces in order to
amend the Constitution in relation to some of the most contentious areas
of constitutional concern, including amendments to the composition of
the Supreme Court, to the use of English and French, and to the amending
procedure.41 Section 43 sets out a special procedure for amendments in
relation to constitutional provisions that apply to some but not all of the
provinces. These amendments require the consent of the Senate, the
House of Commons, and the legislative assembly of the provinces to
which the amendment applies.42 In addition, Part V provides for
unilateral constitutional amendments at the federal and provincial
spheres. Section 44 provides that, subject to sections 41 and 42,
Parliament can unilaterally amend the Constitution of Canada in relation
to Canada’s executive, the Senate and the House by way of the ordinary
legislative process. And section 45 provides that, subject to section 41, a
provincial legislature can unilaterally amend the constitution of the
province, again by means of the ordinary legislative process.43
This review of the text of Part V shows that, like sections 91 and 92,
Part V carves out spheres of authority for legislative assemblies based on
subject matter and allocates jurisdictional power over those spheres to
the provincial legislatures, to Parliament, and, for the most part, to
Parliament and the provinces jointly. This plain reading of the text of Part
V suggests that the overarching goal of Part V is to establish a code that
ensures that the orders of government unite in order to amend the
Constitution in ways that bear on the interests of central and local actors.
Part V identifies areas of concern that are necessarily of joint interest to
Parliament and the provinces and requires, as a result of that interest,
cooperative efforts in order to bring about their reform. As the Supreme
Court explained in the Senate Reform Reference, the purpose of Part V is
40

Id., s. 42(1).
Id., s. 41.
42
Id., s. 43.
43
On legislative authority to amend the Constitution see Warren J. Newman, “Constitutional
Amendment by Legislation” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), at 105 and Warren J. Newman, “Putting One’s Faith
in a Higher Power: Supreme Law, the Senate Reform Reference, Legislative Authority and the
Amending Process” (2015) 34 N.J.C.L. 99.
41
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to implement amending procedures “designed to foster dialogue between
the federal government and the provinces on matters of constitutional
change”.44
Cooperative federalism is concerned with upholding the constitutional
balance of federal-provincial power. It aims to facilitate intergovernmental coordination in the exercise of constitutional authority.
And it is directed towards the interpretation of distributions of
supervisory power over certain spheres of social and political concern to
the legislatures. If these premises are true, it is difficult to conclude that
Part V falls outside the ambit of cooperative federalism. Indeed, the
provisions of Part V immediately draw our gaze to the cooperative
dimensions of the constitutional relationship between the central and
regional powers. In its allocation of powers of consent and veto to
Parliament and the provincial legislatures, the amending procedure
constitutes a clear manifestation of cooperative federalism in Canadian
constitutional life, one that relies on practices of negotiation,
consultation, and ultimately consent, to bring about desired results.45
2. Cooperative Federalism as an Interpretive Principle
Cooperative federalism also resonates as a conceptual frame and
interpretive principle that can make sense of the intricacies of Part V. Indeed,
the jurisprudence interpreting the amending procedure takes seriously the
cooperative principle. For example, in the Senate Reform Reference, the
Supreme Court interpreted the provisions of Part V, recognizing that it had to
be interpreted as a whole, as the meaning of each provision could be
discerned only in relation to the others. The interpretive exercise included
discerning the scope of sections 44 and 45, the unilateral amending
provisions. Section 44 authorizes Parliament to amend the Constitution in
44

Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 37, at para. 31.
A challenge to this account could raise the concern that the multilateral provisions of Part
V only call for agreement amongst legislative actors, not cooperation. The claim here would be that
Part V contemplates a system of consent, veto, and dissent, rather than a more active process of
cooperation. On this view, since cooperation and agreement are not the same, Part V is not an
instance of cooperative federalism any more than the strict approach to the “exclusive” heads of
power set out in sections 91 and 92. Admittedly, the type of intergovernmental interaction
contemplated by Part V is political and subject to the wrangling of policy agendas and strategic
negotiation. However, the political practices that are necessary to achieve the goals of Part V gesture
to the cooperative dimensions of the contemplated multilateralism. In order to reach the consensus
needed to formally amend the Constitution pursuant to the multilateral procedures set out in Part V,
some process of common goal-setting, negotiation, and consent, as between the legislative actors, is
required, a practice that can be reasonably described as cooperation.
45
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certain enumerated circumstances. It provides, “Subject to sections 41 and
42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and
House of Commons”. Section 45 is the provincial equivalent, providing,
“Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively
make laws amending the constitution of the province”.
The interpretation of section 44 is particularly important for
determining the scope of the Part V procedures. A broad interpretation of
Parliament’s unilateral power for Senate reform, for example, would
necessarily limit the multilateral power to reform the Senate provided for
in section 42(1). A narrow interpretation of section 44, on the other hand,
would allow for the multilateral provisions to have wide application.
When undertaking the interpretive task in the Reference, the Court held
that section 44 is narrow in scope. The Court drew on the principle
underlying Part V, which entails joint action by Parliament and the
provinces in matters of joint concern:
…ss. 44 and 45 give the federal and provincial legislatures the ability to
unilaterally amend certain aspects of the Constitution that relate to their
own level of government, but which do not engage the interests of the
other level of government. This limited ability to make changes
unilaterally reflects the principle that Parliament and the provinces are
equal stakeholders in the Canadian constitutional design. Neither level of
government acting alone can alter the fundamental nature and role of the
institutions provided for in the Constitution. This said, those institutions
can be maintained and even changed to some extent under ss. 44 and 45,
provided that their fundamental nature and role remain intact.46

In short, the Court interpreted the unilateral grants of amending power
narrowly, thereby preserving a broad scope for the amending procedures
that call for coordinated action. This approach flowed from the Court’s
recognition that the partners to Canada’s federation are of equal status
and that there is a need to respect the matters of joint concern set out in
Part V. In this way, the interpretation of Part V was an instance in which
the principle of cooperative federalism was implicitly invoked to limit
the scope of unilateral powers under the Constitution.
The interpretive significance of the cooperative principle was
highlighted again when the Court measured the government’s proposals
for Senate reform against the procedural demands of Part V. In concluding
that the implementation of consultative elections triggered the general
46

Senate Reform Reference, supra, note 37, at para. 48.
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amending formula, the Court reiterated the need for federal and provincial
officials to act jointly in order to bring about reform that would have a
qualitative impact on matters of joint concern. The “scope of s. 44 is
limited”, the Court held. “[I]t does not encompass consultative elections,
which would change the Senate’s fundamental nature and role by
endowing it with a popular mandate.”47
The same was true on the issue of altering the length of a senatorial term
in office. In arguing that the multilateral procedures did not apply to
government proposals to change the tenure of senators, the Attorney General
argued that the multilateral provisions of section 42(1) (i.e., those expressly
listing categories of Senate reform that required joint action) should
be narrowly interpreted in light of the grant of unilateral authority over
Senate reform set out in section 44. The Court rejected this submission.
While agreeing that the express subject matters listed in section 42(1) could
not be read beyond their written terms, the Court held that the general
amending rule, section 38(1), cannot be circumscribed by unilateral powers:
…the unilateral federal amendment procedure is limited. It is not a
broad procedure that encompasses all constitutional changes to the
Senate which are not expressly included within another procedure in
Part V. The history, language, and structure of Part V indicate that s.
38, rather than s. 44 , is the general procedure for constitutional
amendment. Changes that engage the interests of the provinces in the
Senate as an institution forming an integral part of the federal system
can only be achieved under the general amending procedure… 48

The Court concluded that section 44 was indeed “an exception” to the
general procedure and therefore could only apply when the proposed
measure would not engage provincial interests.49
The Supreme Court Act Reference offers another example of the
cooperative principle being invoked in the interpretation of Part V. This
opinion suggests that joint constitutional interests can impose constraints
on the exercise of unilateral powers. This time, the unilateral power is
outside Part V, found in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which
authorizes Parliament to constitute, maintain, and organize a general
court of appeal Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada is constituted by
virtue of ordinary legislation,50 pursuant to this exclusive federal power.
47
48
49
50

Id., at para. 69.
Id., at para. 75.
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Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
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The Court’s task in the Reference was to determine the scope of section
101 in light of Part V. Recall that sections 42(1)(d) and 41(d) provide that
constitutional amendments in relation to the Supreme Court must be made
according to the general procedure and those in relation to the composition
of the Court require unanimous consent. In undertaking this task, the Court
relied on a broad interpretation of the cooperative provisions of Part V to
limit the scope of Parliament’s power under section 101:
It is true that at Confederation, Parliament was given the authority
through s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to “provide for the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of
Appeal for Canada”. Parliament undoubtedly has the authority under s.
101 to enact routine amendments necessary for the continued
maintenance of the Supreme Court, but only if those amendments do
not change the constitutionally protected features of the Court. The
unilateral power found in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 has been
overtaken by the Court’s evolution in the structure of the Constitution,
as recognized in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.51

According to the majority of the Court, not only had the evolution of
the Court’s constitutional status and the entrenchment of cooperative
authority over reform of the Court narrowed the scope of Parliament’s
section 101 authority, it had also given rise to a positive obligation on
Parliament to fulfil that authority. “[W]hat s. 101 now requires”, the
majority wrote, “is that Parliament maintain — and protect — the
essence of what enables the Supreme Court to perform its current role.”
In other words, in light of the cooperative authority set out in Part V,
Parliament is obligated to respect and preserve the joint interests of the
federal and provincial actors manifested in the institutional dimensions
of the Supreme Court of Canada.
This discussion of the relationships and requirements of the amending
procedure shows that Part V properly belongs in a conversation about
cooperative federalism in Canadian constitutional law. Indeed, Part V’s
expression of the principle of cooperative federalism is strong. As a
descriptive concept, it provides that with some exceptions, the
Constitution of Canada can be amended only with some measure of
federal-provincial consensus, as determined by the subject matter of the
proposed reform. Realizing that consensus requires coordinated action
between provincial and federal political actors. The opportunity for
51
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, [2014]
1 S.C.R. 433, at para. 101 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act Reference”].
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unilateral reform is limited to matters of concern only to one level of
government; actors from both orders of government must agree to
proposals that engage federal and provincial interests. As an interpretive
principle, the cooperative dimensions of Canadian federalism help to
delineate the scope of the formal amending procedures. Indeed, the
cooperative demands of the amending formula suggest that the grants of
joint jurisdiction in Part V are not to be constrained by broadly
interpreted unilateral powers. This approach culminates in the default
amending procedure in Canada, which is, at its core, cooperative.
Ultimately, Part V imagines a structure of government in Canada in
which coordination and consensus between orders of government are
necessary in order to amend the Constitution in relation to issues that are
of particular importance to the nation. It is not just the case that Part V
would not make sense without an underlying conception of federalism.
Rather, it’s the case that Part V would not make sense without an
underlying conception of a cooperative version of federalism.52 In
particular, cooperative federalism offers a conceptual frame through which
to assess the successes and failures of Part V that are linked to both
descriptive accounts of political unwillingness to exercise multilateral Part
V authority, and principled analyses of the logic and constitutional
coherence of Canada’s constitutional amending procedures. The next
section moves from thinking about cooperative federalism as a way of
understanding the animating principles and interpretive challenges of Part
V to a consideration of how insights drawn from Part V can contribute to
understanding other parts of the Constitution, and in particular, sections 91
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AS CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The strong claim to cooperative federalism in Part V suggests that the
principle of cooperative federalism is not simply a matter of political
practice or brought to life through judicial interpretation of sections 91
and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Rather, the principle is also
expressed through the obligations and procedures established by the
constitutional text and structure of Part V. What does this mean? What
does it mean to say that cooperative federalism is embedded in the
52
This picks up on a suggestion about the significance of cooperative federalism in the
interpretation of Part V in Kate Glover, “Structure, Substance and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional
Architecture from the Senate Reform Reference” (2013) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 221, at 232-33.
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structure of the Constitution, perhaps alongside other forms or
understandings of federalism? The structural dimensions of the
constitution take the form of principle, process, institution, and text.
Together, and in conjunction with the constitution’s substantive claims,
the constitution’s structural dimensions reflect the vision of government
that the constitution is intended to implement.53 Further, they refer to the
basic internal structure of the constitution, that is, the ways the
constitution and the institutions it imagines are configured, recognizing
the ways in which the various components of the constitution are linked
and tethered to each other in various, often shifting, ways.54
If the constitution aims to realize a particular vision of political life, it
follows that the constitution should be interpreted with a view to realizing
and facilitating that vision.55 A structural approach to constitutional
interpretation draws insights about the meaning of the constitution from its
architecture. Exercises of constitutional interpretation must account for
these structural links, as well as the broader institutional frameworks,
structures, and landscape imagined within them.56 As the Supreme Court
explained in the Senate Reform Reference:
The notion of architecture expresses the principle that “[t]he individual
elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and must be
interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution as a
whole”… The assumptions that underlie the text and the manner in
which the constitutional provisions are intended to interact with one
another must inform our interpretation, understanding, and application
of the text.57
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The vision that underpins the constitution cannot be distilled to a single
aim or principle. Canada’s constitutional order strives to realize the ideals of
democracy, the rule of law, federalism, human dignity, judicial
independence, and more. But the claim of this article is that the vision
imagined by Canada’s constitution includes, alongside these other principles
and iterations, an aspiration towards cooperative federalism. This aspiration
captures the belief that joint action between orders of government is required
at times in order for constitutional powers and goals to be exercised and
realized. A constitutional vision shaped in part by cooperative federalism is
one that accepts that the constitutional balance of the Canadian federation is
preserved and promoted by the “enactment of co-ordinated federal and
provincial schemes to better deal with the local needs of unity and
diversity”.58 It is a vision that respects and values intergovernmental efforts
as a way of addressing the needs and realities of social and political life. It is
also a vision that directs our gaze to the insights of cooperative federalism
across areas and contexts of constitutional interpretation.
The obvious next question is, what does this approach to constitutional
interpretation entail? In part, an enriched structural understanding of
cooperative federalism offers a principled justification for some parts of
the existing state of the law. For example, the enriched approach provides
support for considering the principle of cooperative federalism in all cases
dealing with the interpretation of sections 91 and 92, even in cases in
which the facts do not disclose deliberate or negotiated joint action
between orders of government. When intergovernmental relations are
understood, descriptively and structurally, in cooperative terms, then
constitutional interpretation should promote and facilitate that vision of
government, rather than hinder it. Once we accept that the constitution
aims to implement some form of cooperative government, then we find
support for an approach to constitutional interpretation that, at a minimum,
respects and facilitates cooperative intergovernmental relationships.
On this approach, invoking cooperative federalism as the guiding
interpretive principle in cases of unilateral action is neither a
mischaracterization of the nature of Canadian federalism, nor a judicial
misstep.59 Rather, it is a manifestation of the deep constitutional character
58
Quebec (AG), supra, note 1, at para. 148, citing PHS, supra, note 34 and Tsilhqot’in
Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.), revg
[2012] B.C.J. No. 1302 (B.C.C.A.). See also Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern
Development), [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] F.C.J. No. 383 (F.C.A.).
59
On the Court’s role in managing the division of powers and cooperative federalism in
particular, see Wade K. Wright, “Courts as Facilitators of Intergovernmental Dialogue: Cooperative
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of cooperative federalism. In these cases, the reliance on cooperative
federalism as the guiding interpretive principle can be justified as ensuring
that the grants of power set out in sections 91 and 92 are interpreted in a
way that allows for cooperation in present and future cases. In other words,
cooperative federalism encourages interpretations of unilateral jurisdiction
through the lens of the cooperative principle, such that future instances of
cooperation dealing with the same subject matter are available.
A structural claim to cooperative federalism also lends support to an
interpretive approach to the division of powers that takes seriously the
interjurisdictional effects of joint engagement and disengagement. If the
constitution aims to implement a vision of government that is not only
federal but also, at least in some capacity, cooperatively federal, then
some interpretive and practical consequences must flow therefrom.
The calibration of those consequences, both the duties and limits
attendant upon cooperative government, will have to be worked out in future
cases. But history shows that constitutional law and politics are sufficiently
robust and flexible to ensure that the application and invocation of
cooperative federalism are attentive to the particularities of context and the
considerations raised by other constitutional values. In thinking through the
implications of the embedded status of cooperative federalism in the
ordinary legislative process, a structural understanding of cooperative
federalism does not suggest or entail a positive duty on political actors to
cooperate or to come to the negotiating table in the event that a cooperative
hand is extended by the other order of government. Such obligations do not
exist in the strong cooperative context of constitutional amendment, absent
the obligations of engagement and negotiation in good faith that arise in
special circumstances such as those contemplated in the Secession
Reference. Indeed, in the amendment context, the legal requirement for
consensus, and the political practices needed to bring it about, are engaged
as soon as contemplated formal action touches on one of the subject matters
in the multilateral amending procedure in a qualitatively significant way.
There is no reason why cooperative federalism in the ordinary legislative
context would or should entail the same approach. Indeed, the argument is
not that the mandates of cooperation from Part V are transplanted to the
legislative context. The argument is, rather, that both contexts are shaped by
and bring life to the same principle; the way in which that principle comes to
Federalism and Judicial Review” (2016) 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 365 and Wade K. Wright, “Facilitating
Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 625.
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life in each context will – and should – vary. Indeed, articulating the duties
attendant upon a relationship between constitutional actors is a familiar
exercise. This is the bread and butter of the division of powers jurisprudence,
of the practices and jurisprudence dealing with the Crown’s duty to consult
with Indigenous people in decision-making that could affect Aboriginal
rights, and the circumstances addressed in, and following from, the
Secession Reference.
That said, if cooperative federalism is a constitutional value to which
Canada aspires, it is reasonable to conclude that some positive action is
called for in order to realize that aspiration and, at a minimum, not to
undermine it. The minimum positive action that can be imagined is an
obligation, whether in the form of a duty of loyalty or good faith (as is
relied on in the duty to consult and secession contexts), that would attach
to the exercise of legislative authority once governmental actors have
taken formal steps to enter an intergovernmental partnership. As the
dissenting judges in Quebec (AG) explained, the logic of cooperative
federalism demands such a minimum duty:
The dominant tide with respect to the division of powers admits of
overlapping powers and favours co-operation between the different levels
of governments. It also supports the validity of schemes established jointly
through partnerships developed between members of our federation. In our
opinion, our courts must protect such schemes both when they are
implemented and when they are dismantled. It would hardly make sense to
encourage co-operation and find that schemes established in the context of
a partnership are valid while at the same time refusing to take this
particular context into account when those schemes are terminated.60

The dissenting judges’ reasoning reflects the notion, consistent with the
broad strokes of the Part V context, that once provincial and federal efforts
are engaged in a common enterprise, there are common interests in the
management of that enterprise. These interests include, at a minimum, the
management of the enterprise’s dismantling. As Professor Poirier points out,
the dissenting opinion in Quebec (AG) reflects a richer account of
cooperative federalism than the majority is willing to acknowledge. She
explains that this account is ultimately more consistent with the principles
established in earlier cases dealing with cooperative schemes:
The dissenting judges…have sought to deepen the meaning of
“cooperative federalism”. Having promoted concerted action between

60
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orders, and having lowered the “picket fences” which defined the
original Canadian federal system, they recognise that the judicial
branch cannot logically slide back to a traditional dualist conception of
federalism…The minority position is prudent, nuanced [and]…in line
both with contemporary federal practice, and with jurisprudential
development.61

Given the prominent role that cooperative federalism has already been
given in the interpretation of sections 91 and 92, it is unlikely that the
way in which the constitutional doctrines are articulated would change to
accommodate an enriched structural account. The effect would more
likely be felt in the details, in discerning the contexts in which a
structural understanding of cooperative federalism has effects and those
in which it does not. A structural understanding of cooperative federalism
could likely justify an analysis that goes further than the dissent in
Quebec (AG) was willing to go, drawing perhaps on comparative
accounts of federal obligations of loyalty and good faith from other
jurisdictions and contexts.62 One risk of these positive obligations is, as
the majority in Quebec (AG) pointed out, that any recognition of a
positive obligation would act as a deterrent of cooperative action.63
Taking this further, drawing on experience from the amendment context,
there is a risk of stalemate and inaction or attempts to do indirectly what
cannot be achieved – or what is undesirable to achieve — directly. This
account of the practical realities of Part V and what the practical realities
might be in the legislative context raises the question as to whether it is
appropriate or appealing to draw lessons about cooperation from the
amendment context when the consensus called for in the amending
formulas has proven to be unworkable in practice.
This question forces a confrontation with the constitutional elephant
in the room – the dysfunctional, or perhaps non-functional, nature of the
amending procedure. This challenge points out that while it is not the
case that Part V has never been successfully invoked, political realities
have made doing so difficult. This article argues that despite the
61
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obstacles that have characterized attempts at constitutional amendment in
the past, Part V remains a meaningful interpretive source. First, as
explained above, the demands of structural interpretation require it.
Second, the recent absence of political will to engage in constitutional
negotiations about constitutional amendment does not erode the
aspiration of multilateralism embedded in the structure of Part V or its
effects. Given the attention and recognition shown to the amending
procedures in political rhetoric, it cannot be argued that Part V has gone
the way of disallowance and thus no longer warrants attention. Third, the
variability of the duties and expectations that flow from constitutional
principles mean that there is nothing inherent in the principle that limits
its capacity to be adapted to the legislative context in a way that is both
meaningful and not conducive to stalemate. We must expect and call on
our political actors to embody and pursue constitutional ideals or,
ultimately, change them. The space for cooperative efforts, whether in
the constitutional amendment or legislative context, is an opportunity to
imagine the full range of possible means by which to implement policy
goals, rather than a burden to lament for its potential pitfalls.

V. CONCLUSION
This article contends that cooperative federalism has a deeper place in
the architecture of the Constitution of Canada than is suggested in recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. It supports this claim by looking to the
role of intergovernmental consensus contemplated in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and showing that Part V is a strong expression of
cooperative federalism within Canadian constitutionalism. It argues that
the “modern view” of federalism in Canada is enriched when it is
understood as extending beyond the practices and interpretations of
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
More work remains to be done to further test, contest, and flesh out
the implications of this claim in the various contexts of constitutional
interpretation and practice. The historical account of the role of
cooperative and non-cooperative action in the context of constitutional
amendment will help to calibrate the scope and weight of the cooperative
principle in political and interpretive practice going forward. So too will
accounts of other cooperative and uncooperative dimensions of the
constitution beyond sections 91 and 92. An obvious example would be an
accounting of the implications of section 35.1 of the Constitution Act,
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1982, which provides that before the provisions of the constitution
dealing with Aboriginal rights are amended, a constitutional conference
will be held and the Prime Minister will “invite representatives of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada to participate in the discussions on that
item”.64 Moreover, the concerns that accompany a structural account of
cooperative federalism require further attention. For instance, does this
account direct the evolution of federalism as an inherent assumption of
the constitution in any particular ways? And, what are the limits on the
use of a cooperative claim to establish obligations and expectations for
political actors? The starting point for exploring these questions and
concerns in the interpretive sphere could be more reflection on the
articulation of federalism and the obligations that flow from it in the
Secession Reference.
This additional exploration into cooperative federalism as a structural
principle in Canadian constitutionalism will help to expand on the
lessons of this article. It is not just that there is something to be learned
about cooperative federalism when constitutional amendment is brought
into the mix. There is also something to be learned about constitutional
amendment from the traditional division of powers context and
something to learn about that traditional context from experience with
constitutional amendment. On the one hand, cooperative federalism
offers a useful frame through which to think about the conceptual
foundation for the amending procedures and the place of Part V in the
broader constitutional context. On the other hand, allocations of
constitutional power outside of the traditional context of sections 91 and
92 highlight the various ways in which constitutional interests intersect.
They serve as a reminder that the issues of our political lives often resist
the categorization as local or national, regional or central. These are
lessons of structural constitutionalism. The hope is that this focus will
contribute to ensuring that those powers are interpreted and exercised in
a constitutionally principled, and structurally sound, way.
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